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INDIAN LAW 
NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE V. ADSIT: ARE STATE 
JURISDICTIONAL DISCLAIMERS STILL THE INDIAN'S 
ASSURANCE OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit,1 the Ninth Circuit 
held that Montana'sll failure to repeal disclaimers of jurisdiction 
over Indian lands contained in the state's constitution and ena-
bling act barred it from assuming jurisdiction over these lands.3 
The lower court4 had relied on the Supreme Court's decision in 
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States," 
(commonly referred to as Akin),' to hold that the McCarran 
amendment? granted jurisdiction to state courts to determine 
water rights within their borders. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit 
held8 that Montana's litigation did not involve factors establish-
ing the exceptional circumstances· which would justify dismissal 
of a federal action in favor of state jurisdiction in a water rights 
1. 668 F.2d lOBO (9th Cir.) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel memben were Choy, J. 
and Merrill, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982). 
2. The Adsit case was consolidated with the following cases: San Carlos Apache 
Tribe v. State of Arizona, 668 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982), 
and Navajo Nation v. United States, 668 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 
(1982). The issue in all three cases was that of determining the proper forum for adjudi-
cation of the Indians' reserved water rights. The Adsit case originated in Montana; both 
the San Carlos and the Navajo Nation cases originated in Arizona. 
3. 668 F.2d at 1087. The disclaimer provision is found at MONT. CONST. art. I. The 
enabling act was approved by Congress at 25 Stat. 676 (1889). For a discussion of the 
disclaimer, see infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
4. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Tongue River Water Usen, 484 F. Supp. 31 (D.C. 
Mont. 1979). 
5. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
6. Colorado River Water Conservation District was decidedoconcurrently with Akin 
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). . 
7. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976). See infra note 33 for text. 
8. The Ninth Circuit fint determined that Akin and the McCarran amendment did 
not act to repeal disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indian lands. Therefore, the court's en-
tire discussion of the facton establishing the exceptional circumstances in Akin is 
dictum. 
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controversy. Furthermore, the court took the opportunity to ap-
ply a narrow interpretation of the exceptional circumstances fac-
tors established in Akin.lo The Ninth Circuit's holding in Adsit 
is in direct conflict with the recent Tenth Circuit decision in Ji-
carilla Apache Tribe u. United States. ll 
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 1975, the Indian tribes12 sued in federal district court to 
adjudicate water rights18 of Montana's Tongue River and Rose-
bud Creek.14 Subsequently, the United States brought two 
suits 111 for the same purpose in its fiduciary capacity as trustee 
for the Indian tribes. The defendant state agency and individu-
alsle then brought suit in state court for a determination of all 
existing rights to the Tongue River and Rosebud Creek. The dis-
trict court consolidated the federal cases and stayed proceedings 
pending the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision in the fac-
tually similar Akin case. Akin was decided in 1976. 
In May, 1979, Montana enacted a state water consolidation 
plan.17 The district court found that the state litigation, coupled 
10. See infra note 44. 
11. 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979). 
12. The plaintiffs included the Northern Cheyenne tribe and several other reserva-
tion tribes. 
13. The specific water rights issue was to determine the quantity that should be 
allocated to the Indians. In the landmark case of Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 
(1908), the Supreme Court held that there is an implied reservation of water sufficient to 
sustain the tribal existence. The exact quantity of water reserved was not determined by 
Winters. For a discussion of how the Winters rights allocations conflict with state water 
allocations, see infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
14. Jurisdiction was alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976), which provides: "The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian 
tribe ... wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or trea-
ties of the United States." 
15. Jurisdiction was alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976) which provides that 
"[Tlhe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, or proceedings 
commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof .... " Tradition-
ally, Indian water rights have been reserved in trust to the federal government. Winters 
v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). It is out of this trust relationship that the United 
States brought suit as a fiduciary for the Indians. 
16. The defendants included the Montana Department of Natural Resources and 
other individuals and corporations who claimed water rights under differing legal theo-
ries. In all, there were nearly 9,000 defendants. See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Tongue 
River Water Users, 484 F. Supp. 31, 36 (D.C. Mont. 1979). 
17. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-211-85-2-243 (1979). The enactment of this bill was 
undoubtedly an attempt to fall within the purview of Akin. 
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with the comprehensive water plan, was similar to and therefore 
controlled by Akin.18 Thereafter, the district court determined 
that the factors in Akin favoring state jurisdiction were present 
in the Adsit case. IS Consequently, the district court dismissed all 
pending federal actions as an exercise of "wise judicial adminis-
tration"20 as provided for by Akin.21 Plaintiff Indian tribes and 
the United States appealed the finding of state jurisdiction. 
C. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Judicial doctrines to resolve jurisdictional questions over 
reservation Indians involve much complexity, contradiction, and 
ambiguity. Unraveling the complex jurisdictional issues 
presented in Adsit requires an analysis of state jurisdictional 
disclaimers, pertinent legislative enactments and related Su-
preme Court decisions. Furthermore, sensitive state interests22 
must be integrated into the judicial analysis. 
Development of the Federal-State Relationship of Western 
Water Law 
During the nineteenth century the arid West developed the 
doctrine of prior appropriation to govern water rights. The prior 
appropriation system favors users who first divert water for ben-
eficial use, regardless of proximity to the stream.iS In 1877, Con-
gress passed the Desert Land Act,lIf making state law the exclu-
18. 484 F. Supp. at 36. 
19.Id. 
20. For a discussion of "wise judicial administration," see infra note 43. 
21. 484 F. Supp. at 36. 
22. There are several state interests which must be considered. First, recognition of 
federally reserved water rights restricts the exercise of state sovereignty and in some 
instances preempts provisions of state constitutions or statutes. Second, the rights inter-
fere with efficient operation of the state prior appropriation system. This occurs because 
federally reserved water rights are withdrawn from public domain without consideration 
of prior use. This disruption of the state's water allocation scheme is particularly dis-
turbing to the western states where water is scarce. The conflict arises since the states 
would like to manage water use to the benefit of their own citizens and to their economic 
advantage. For an excellent survey of the multi-faceted federal-state relationship in 
western water law, see 2 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 100.1-107.3 (1967) 
[hereinafter R. CLARK.); H08ktyk, Who Controls the Water? The Emerging Balance 
Among Federal, State, and Indian Jurisdictional Claims and its Impact on Energy De-
velopment in the Upper Colorado and Upper Missouri River Basins, 18 Tulsa L.J. 1 
(1982). 
23. See R. CLARK, supra note 22, at §§ 4.1-2. 
24. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-
339 (1976». 
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sive source for obtaining appropriate water rights on public 
lands. 
Disputes often arise when the federal government and states 
disagree about the management of federally reserved water 
rights. In Winters v. United States,20 the Supreme Court upheld 
federal claims to reserved water rights and tacitly acknowledged 
a continuing federal interest in unappropriated waters. This ju-
dicial vindication of federal claims has been a source of substan-
tial frustration to the states since it interferes with the prior ap-
propriation system.26 
State Jurisdictional Disclaimers 
In 1887, Montana was admitted to statehood on condition 
that it disclaim all rights and titles to jurisdiction over Indian 
land.27 The disclaimer in the enabling act was reinforced by a 
disclaimer of jurisdiction in Montana's constitution.28 
Originally, states with jurisdictional disclaimers were power-
less to adjudicate claims involving any Indian rights or titles.29 
Recently, the trend has been to allow states greater authority in 
adjudicating Indian rights claims.so In White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Arizona, the Ninth Circuit held that a disclaimer state 
could impose fishing and hunting fees on non-Indians on a reser-
vation. SI The court reasoned that the state's interest in preserv-
ing wildlife living or migrating within the boundries of both the 
state and the reservation was sufficiently strong to override the 
• 
25. 207 u.s. 564 (1908). Winters involved reservation of non-navigable waters by 
withdrawal from the public domain for use 88 an Indian reservation. Specifically, the 
Winters Court found that when a reservation is created out of the public domain there is 
an implied reservation of water sufficient to sustain the tribal existence. Id. at 576. 
26. See supra note 22. 
27. Montana's enabling act provides that the state "disclaim all right and title to 
the unappropriated public lands ... owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes 
.... " 25 Stat. 676 (1889). 
28. The constitutional disclaimer provides: "[A)lliands owned or held by any Indian 
or Indian tribes shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United 
States .... " MONT. CONST. art. I. The disclaimers were part of the treaty agreements 
negotiated between the United States and Indian tribes. By agreeing to discontinue 
fighting, the Indians were promised several parcels of land in newly admitted states. 
29. See Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
30. The trend allowing greater jurisdictional authority to the states is called the 88-
similationist trend. See Dellwo, Recent Developments in the Northwest Regarding In-
dian Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 101 (1980) [hereinafter Dellwo). 
31. 649 F.2d 1274, 1284 (9th Cir. 1981). 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/14
1983] INDIAN LAW 333 
disclaimer.32 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit's holding avoided 
any determination of reserved rights in a state with a jurisdic-
tional disclaimer. 
The McCarran Amendment and Public Law 83-280 
Two pieces of federal legislation passed during the 1950's 
have worked together to enhance state jurisdictional powers over 
Indian affairs. In 1952, Congress enacted the McCarran amend-
ment which granted state courts jurisdiction over the United 
States when litigation involved comprehensive adjudication of 
water rights and the United States was a necessary party.33 The 
amendment resulted in extending the consent of the United 
States to be joined in litigation regarding water rights by waiv-
ing federal sovereign immunity in certain instances.34 While the 
McCarran amendment did not specifically refer to Indian water 
rights or reservation land, it is applicable where the federal gov-
ernment litigates as trustee for Indian tribes. 
A year after passage of the McCarran amendment, Public 
Law 83-280311 (PL-280) was enacted, establishing the mechanism 
for transfering criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian lands 
from the federal to state governments. Five states received a 
mandatory transfer of jurisdiction under PL-280.38 All other 
states had the option to assume jurisdiction if they so elected. A 
32. An example of regulatory authority is a state's interest in conserving fish and 
game. This arises because a tribe cannot claim to "own" the fish and game on a reserva-
tion. Consequently, the state has a "special interest in regulating and preserving wildlife 
for the benefit of its citizens." 649 F.2d at 1283, citing Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game 
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 392 (1978). 
33. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976). The pertinent portion of the McCarran Act states: 
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant 
in any suit (1) for adjudication of rights to the use of water of 
a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of 
such rights, where it appears that the United States is the 
owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by ap-
propriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or oth-
erwise, and the United States is a necesary party to such suit. 
34. See supra note 33. 
35. Act of Aug. IS, 1953, ch. 50S, 67 Stat. 588-90 (now codified as amended in 28 
U.S.C. § 18 (1976». 
36. Originally, the statute automatically transferred to five willing states, and of-
fered to all others, civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians regardless of 
the Indians' preference for continued autonomy. The five states were: California, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Alaska was added in 1958. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, 
Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545 (1958). 
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1968 amendment to PL-280 imposed the requirement that the 
states obtain the consent of Indian tribes before exercising juris-
diction over Indian affairs. 37 The amendment also increased the 
difficulty for those states, like Montana, to repeal their jurisdic-
tional disclaimers affecting Indian lands. 
In Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation,38 the Supreme 
Court held that states with disclaimers could validly assume ju-
risdiction so long as the state utilized the proper legislative re-
peals.39 While Yakima made clear that a state constitutional 
amendment was not necessary to adopt PL-280 jurisdiction, it 
did not establish clear guidelines as to what constitutes a valid 
legislative repeal. 
Although PL-280 makes no mention of water rights, it has 
operated, in conjunction with the McCarran amendment, to 
drastically decrease traditional federal protection over Indian 
water rights. Matters previously under either federal or tribal 
authority40 have been opened to state jurisdiction. 
Concurrent Jurisdiction Under the McCarran Amendment 
In United States v. District Court for Eagle County,41 the 
Supreme Court held that state jurisdiction is permissible in 
cases involving general adjudication of all rights of water users. 
The Court also held that the McCarran amendment's consent to 
jurisdiction includes reserved water rights claims.42 Relying on 
Eagle County, the Court in Akin extended permissive state ju-
risdiction to encompass Indian reserved rights. The Court inter-
37. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1322-26 (1976). Section 1326 provides: 
State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this subchapter with 
respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with 
respect to both, shall be applicable in Indian country only 
where the enrolled Indians within the affected area of such In-
dian country accept such jurisdiction by a majority vote of the 
adult Indians .... 
38. 439 U.S. 463 (1979). 
39. What constitutes appropriate legislative repeals has been the focal point of con-
siderable litigation, including the Adsit case. For an excellent historical overview of PL-
280, see Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation 
Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535 (1975) [hereinafter Goldberg). 
40. For a discussion of the federal-tribal-state role in Indian affairs and its current 
development, see Dellwo, supra note 30. 
41. 401 U.S. 520 (1971). 
42. Id. at 524. 
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preted the McCarran amendment to mean that jurisdiction over 
Indian water rests concurrently in the federal and state courts. 
Specifically, the Court held that considerations of "wise judicial 
administration"43 justify dismissal of a federal suit. Several ex-
ceptional circumstances were listed that justify state adjudica-
tion of Indian water rights.44 Furthermore, the Court held that 
in state comprehensive water plan litigation, states could join 
the United States as a party defendant.4G 
The Tenth Circuit's Application 
Since Akin arose in Colorado, a state that did not disclaim 
jurisdiction over Indian rights or land in its constitution or ena-
bling act, the Akin Court was not faced with determining the 
effect of jurisdictional disclaimers. The Tenth Circuit, however, 
faced this question in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States,48 
and held that the presence of a disclaimer in the state's consti-
tution or enabling act does not justify treating the state differ-
ently than a state without a disclaimer. 
The Tenth Circuit was persuaded by the Akin rationale and 
previous Supreme Court decisions.47 Particularly influential was 
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan48 (Kake), which held that a 
disclaimer state could regulate the fishing of off-reservation In-
dians. The Tenth Circuit interpreted the holding in Kake to 
43. Akin, 424 U.S. at 818. The principle of "wise judicial administration" relates to 
the determination that the Akin factors exist. If these factors do exist, the federal court 
must consent to state court adjudication. 
44. [d. The exceptional circumstances present in Akin are commonly known as the 
"Akin factors." They include the following: (1) The state litigation involved a completed 
proceeding, while the federal proceedings were infantile; (2) The state proceeding was 
comprehensive, while the federal proceeding was piecemeal; (3) The state proceeding was 
initiated prior to the federal proceeding; (4) The federal proceeding was 300 miles from 
the district in question, therefore suggestive of a forum non conveniens; (5) The federal 
government was participating in state water rights proceedings in other parts of the 
state, indicating a potential conflict of interest. 
45. The Akin Court rejected the argument advanced by the United States that the 
McCarran amendment granted consent to join the United States as a party defendant in 
a state court proceeding only if the water rights of the United States were acquired pur-
suant to state law. The Court held that the state court was dealing with an all-inclusive 
statute concerning "the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system" 
including those waters reserved by the United States for the use of the Indian reserva-
tions. 424 U.S. 800, 810, citing Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 524. 
46. 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979). 
47. [d. 
48. 369 U.S. 60 (1962). 
7
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mean that disclaimers are limited to matters of a proprietary na-
ture.49 As a result, it held that the McCarran amendment autho-
rizes a state, which disclaimed jurisdiction upon entering the 
Union, to assume jurisdiction over federally reserved Indian 
water rights. liD The Jicarilla court's holding is consistent with 
the trend, particularly evident since Akin, of increasing state ju-
risdiction over Indian affairs. iiI 
D. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
The plaintiffs in Adsit argued that because of the disclaim-
ers in Montana's constitutionli3 and enabling act, the federal 
courts had exclusive jurisdiction over Indian water rights. They 
maintained that Akin was not controlling because it did not in-
volve a state with jurisdictional disclaimers. Furthermore, the 
plaintiffs argued that since the disclaimers had not been re-
pealed by Montana, state jurisdiction was barred. liS 
The defendants argued that jurisdictional disclaimers only 
preclude a state from adjudicating proprietary interests. They 
asserted that the Montana litigation involved water rights, and 
therefore the disclaimers did not bar the state from assuming 
jurisdiction. The defendants maintained that the exceptional 
circumstances1i4 in Akin which overcame policies favoring federal 
adjudication of Indian water rights were also present in Adsit. 
Consequently, in the interest of "wise judicial administration,"1i1i 
a comprehensive adjudication of all related water rights issues in 
state court was necessary. 
1. The Majority Opinion 
The Disclaimer Issue 
Beginning its analysis with a discussion of jurisdictional dis-
claimers, the Ninth Circuit found that Akin was not controlling 
because Colorado, the state where Akin arose, did not have ju-
49. The Tenth Circuit held that a disclaimer state could assert jurisdiction over In-
dian lands as long as such interference did not "interfere with reservation self-govern-
ment or impair a right granted or reserved by federal law." 610 F.2d at 1135. 
50. [d. 
51. See Dellwo, supra note 30. 
52. See supra note 28. 
53. 668 F.2d at 1083. 
54. See supra note 44. 
55. 424 U.S. at 818-19. 
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risdictional disclaimers. liS Since Montana did have a valid juris-
dictional disclaimer, the court focused on the enactment and re-
peal of the disclaimer. 
The distinction between states with and without jurisdic-
tional disclaimers was predicated on an analysis of the legislative 
intent underlying the passage of PL-280. The court found that 
PL-280 was enacted primarily to control "the problem of law-
lessness on certain Indian reservations ... [that lack] adequate 
tribal institutions for law enforcement."117 With this in mind, the 
Ninth Circuit examined section 6 of PL-280 which states: "The 
provisions of this subchapter shall not become effective with re-
spect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until 
the people thereof have appropriately amended their State con-
stitution or statutes, as the case may be. "lIB This section imposes 
the requirement that a state take affirmative action before as-
suming jurisdiction over Indian affairs. liB 
Despite the apparent unambiguous language of section 6, 
Montana argued that amendment was not a prerequisite to the 
assumption of jurisdiction under PL-280 because Congress had 
delegated its regulatory authority in Indian country to the states 
when it passed the McCarran amendment.so The Ninth Circuit, 
however, found that the Supreme Court's decision of Washing-
ton v. Yakima Indian Nationsl was controlling. In Yakima, the 
Court held that for a state to repeal its disclaimer of jurisdic-
tion, the state must follow its usual procedural means of amend-
ing its constitution. S2 
56. 668 F.2d at 1085. 
57. Id. at 1084. See H. R. REp. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Seas. 5-6 (1953), quoted in 
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1975). 
58. 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976) .. 
59. S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6-7 (1953) (including report on PL-280 
by Department of Interior). 
60. Montana argued that its disclaimers prohibit regulation, alienation, encum-
brance, or taxation of Indian property held in trust by the United States, but no more; 
therefore, repeal is not necessary before the state can accept jurisdiction under PL-28O. 
Alternatively, it noted that the disclaimers only require that Indian reservations "shall 
be and remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United States." Since 
Congress can repeal PL-28O at will and return jurisdiction to itself, Montana claimed 
Indian lands are never outside the absolute control of CongreBB under the Act. See State 
ex. rel. McDonald v. District Court, 159 Mont. 156, 496 P.2d 78 (1972). 
61. 439 U.S. 463 (1979). 
62. Id. at 493. 
9
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In rejecting Montana's argument, the Adsit court held that 
the McCarran amendment "cannot be read to amend a state 
constitution disclaiming subject matter jurisdiction over such 
matters."es Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that the district 
court erred by failing to determine whether or not such a valid 
legislative repeal had been accomplished.84 Because the Adsit 
court determined that the disclaimers had not been repealed, it 
did not examine the waiver of sovereign immunity provisions of 
the McCarran amendment or the Akin decision.ell 
Having determined that the existence of jurisdictional dis-
claimers was decisive, and distinguishing Akin on this basis, the 
Ninth Circuit chose not to follow the Tenth Circuit's reasoning 
in Jicarilla. Since Jicarilla did not recognize the distinction be-
tween states with disclaimers and those without, the Ninth Cir-
cuit disagreed with the Jicarilla court's application of Kake. ee 
The Ninth Circuit viewed the Kake and White Mountain 
cases as extensions of the state's judicial power to an area al-
ready effectively under state jurisdiction. eT Even though both 
Kake and White Mountain dealt with states having jurisdic-· 
tional disclaimers,ee the Ninth Circuit opined that the regulatory 
rights involved in these cases fell "far short of the power to ad-
judicate a direct challenge to Indian water rights in and to the 
waters of streams."et Therefore, the effect of both cases on In-
dian rights was minimal and thus insufficient precedent to ex-
tend state jurisdiction over substantive property rights. 
~he Akin ~actor8 
The Ninth Circuit found that even if the jurisdictional dis-
63. 66S F.2d at 1085. 
64. [d. at 1086. 
65. [d. at 1085-86. 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51. 
67. 66S F.2d at 1087. 
68. White Mountain originated in Arizona, a state that disclaimed jurisdiction. 
Kake, originated in Alaska, a state that repealed its disclaimers in 1958. The state was, 
however, attempting to claim that it could regulate pursuant to the exception in PL-280 
protecting hunting and fishing rights. The Court treated Alaska as if it still had a dis-
claimer by holding that Alaska did not need the exception In PL-280 to 888ert jurisdic-
tion over the fishing area in question because CongreBB had never reserved the territory 
for the Indians. The scope of the disclaimer was thus irrelevant. For an excellent discus-
sion of PL-280, see Goldberg, supra note 39. 
69. 66S F.2d at 1087. 
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claimers had been repealed it would nonetheless be compelled to 
reverse the lower court.70 In dictum, the court discussed the ex-
ceptional circumstance factors set forth in Akin. 
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the exceptional circumstances 
and disposed of each under the facts of Adsit: (1) Colorado had 
an extensive ongoing water plan, whereas Montana's began four 
years after the federal suits were filed; (2) in Akin, the state pro-
ceeding was comprehensive while the federal proceeding was 
piecemeal; in Adsit, however, the federal proceeding was no 
more piecemeal than was the state's;71 (3) in Akin, the state pro-
ceeding was initiated prior to the federal suit; in Adsit the fed-
eral proceeding was the predecessor;711 and (4) in Akin the fed-
eral proceeding was 300 miles from the water district in 
question, whereas in Adsit, the factor of an inconvenient forum 
was not present.73 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit expressed concern over the risk of 
creating a conflict of interest by requiring the United States to 
represent all of its diverse interests.74 Specifically, the court's 
concern was that when Indian tribes are a necessary party to a 
state proceeding, and neither the federal government nor the tri-
bal nation has consented to such a suit in state court, imposing 
state jurisdiction would violate the tribe's sovereign immunity.711 
The tribe could only protect its rights by intervening, at the ex-
pense of waiving its soveriegn immunity. The Ninth Circuit con-
sidered it inappropriate to place the tribe in such a "Hobson's 
choice. "78 
70.Id. 
71. 668 F.2d at 1088-89. The Adsit court stated that the district court never made 
any findings on the issue of comprehensiveness. It then pointed out that Akin stressed 
federal dismissal only when the federal proceeding is piecemeal and the state proceeding 
is comprehensive. Without this determination, the Adsit court determined that the fed-
eral court may not abdicate its judicial obligations. Id. at 1089. 
72. The Adsit court stated that this factor was not determinative, however, as both 
proceedings were in their infancy. Id. 
73.Id. 
74. The diverse interests the United States may potentially have to protect include 
the national parks, national monuments, and reclamation projects. See Abrams, Re-
served Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal Jurisdiction: 
The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1978). 
75. 668 F.2d at 1090. 
76.Id. 
11
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2. The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissent adopted the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Ji-
carilla, finding that there was no proprietary claim made over 
Indian lands or water rights.77 For the dissent, the sole question 
was whether the language "absolute jurisdiction and control of 
the United States"78 as stated in Montana's constitution should 
be construed to mean "exclusive jurisdiction" of the federal 
courts over all suits involving Indian lands or property rights.7s 
The dissent relied on Kake for the proposition that "abso-
lute" jurisdiction and control does not mean "exclusive" juris-
diction, thereby indicating that in certain instances there may 
be concurrent jurisdiction.80 In addition, because personal juris-
diction was unobtainable over all the defendants,81 the princi-
ples of "wise judicial administration," allowing the state to adju-
dicate the action, should be invoked.81 This was particularly true 
in light of the fact that the rights of the Indians would first be 
determined in federal court, and the entire issue then relitigated 
in state court. 
The dissent concluded by discussing the policy factors 
weighing in favor of state adjudication, emphasizing that water 
adjudication is primarily a local concern. Because of the scarcity 
of water in the western states,88 it is important that each state 
distribute its water in an appropriate manner. Therefore, as long 
as Montana "gives recognition to Indian water rights and their 
establishment pursuant to federal law, [there is] ... no good 
reason why Indians should not be joined with all other water 
users in the state in order to achieve a comprehensive state 
adjudication. "84 
E. SIGNIFICANCE 
In Adsit, the Ninth Circuit expressly disagreed with the 
Tenth Circuit's decision in Jicarilla and held that a state's juris-
77. [d. at 1091. 
78. [d., quoting MONT. CONST. art. I. 
79. [d. at 1091. 
80. 369 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1962). See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
81. There were nearly 9,000 defendants in the Adsit caae. See supra note 16. 
82. 668 F.2d at 1092. 
83. See R. CLARK, supra note 22. 
84. 668 F.2d at 1092. 
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dictional disclaimers prohibits it from assuming jurisdiction over 
reserved Indian water rights. The Ninth Circuit determined that 
the McCarran amendment, which overrides federal immunity in 
comprehensive water adjudications, "cannot be read to amend a 
state constitution disclaiming subject matter jurisdiction"86 over 
Indian affairs. 
Having determined that the district court's ruling on the 
disclaimer issue was incorrect, the court could have remanded 
the case for a determination of whether Montana had validly re-
pealed their disclaimer of jurisdiction.88 Instead, it determined 
that the disclaimer had not been repealed. No further analysis 
was needed to reach a decision. However, the court used the Ad-
sit case as a vehicle to discuss Akin's special circumstance 
factors. 
The Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the Akin fac-
tors reflects its disapproval of diminishing federal jurisdiction 
over Indian water rights litigation. The court's underlying fear 
of accepting Akin as controlling authority lies in Akin's poten-
tial for prohibiting Indians from ever fully litigating their rights 
in federal court. Each time a tribe sued in federal court, the 
state could join the United States as a party to obtain 
dismissal. 87 
The Ninth Circuit's concern over such a liberal interpreta-
tion of the McCarran amendment's grant of jurisdiction is well 
founded. As the Adsit case demonstrates, a state may attempt to 
prevent Indians from litigating in federal court by stalling long 
enough and enacting a comprehensive statute.88 Clearly, Akin 
was predicated on allowing the state to adjudicate a water rights 
proceeding when the state had ,a comprehensive water plan. 
85. [d. at 1085. 
86. In Adsit's companion case, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State of Arizona, 668 
F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982), the Ninth Circuit remanded the 
dispute to the district court to determine whether or not Arizona had properly asserted 
jurisdiction pursuant to PL-280. [d. at 1098. 
87. 668 F.2d at 1090. 
88. Montana's water consolidation plan did not take effect until 1979, four years 
after the Indians first brought suit in federal court. This delay in the enactment of the 
water plan suggests that Montana may have been forum shopping. When litigation arose 
that appeared to be unfavorable to the state's own interests, Montana formulated a 
water plan in an attempt to fall within the purview of Akin and thereby circumvent 
federal jurisdiction. 
13
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Akin was not intended to defeat federal jurisdiction when it ap-
peared that the state's strong self-serving interests would be 
treated more favorably in state court. S9 
The Ninth Circuit's holdil!g in Adsit is based on a reasoned 
application of legislative history, which supports its interpreta-
tion of state jurisdictional disclaimers and PL-280.90 The court 
also carefully distinguished the Kake and White Mountain 
cases. Jicarilla's reliance on the differences in proprietary and 
governmental functions seems to go "too far."91 However, fur-
ther judicial guidance is needed on how to categorize what is a 
legitimate governmental regulation. In many instances, Indian 
tribes continue to need the protection of sovereign immunity 
and federal jurisdiction. Without these shields, adjudication of 
their rights would too often be at the discretion of frequently 
biased state courts.91 
Despite the majority's sound opinion, the dissent raises sev-
eral valid points. The dissent's support of state jurisdiction fo-
cused on the complications of piecemeal adjudication inherent in 
instances of concurrent jurisdiction. This concern was consid-
ered to be the dispositive factor in the Akin decision. The dis-
sent stressed the policy of water allocation as being a local con-
cern deserving local adjudication. 
However valid the desires to avoid piecemeal adjudication 
and to protect state's rights to allocate water may be, it can be 
strongly argued that federal reserved water rights should take 
precedent over legitimate state interests. The determination of 
Indian and other reserved rights should turn not on issues of 
diversion, but rather on Congress' original intent to reserve a 
certain amount of water to support federal and Indian lands.98 
89. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
91. 668.F.2d at 1087. 
92. Under Jicarilla, states would be allowed to create comprehensive regulatory 
statutes for Indian affairs over which they wish to obtain jurisdiction. This suggests that 
the only restraint on the states would be the commerce clause of the United States 
Constitution. 
The Indians' fear of unfair treatment stems from the economic advantage the states 
would gain if water rights were allocated more favorably to its citizens. See supra note 22 
and accompanying text. 
93. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). For a discussion of the Winters 
case, see supra note 25. 
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Consequently, if the litigation takes place in state court, there is 
still the need to have separate proceedings prior to the overall 
adjudication of water rights.84 These proceedings would deter-
mine the amounts of reserved water to be allocated to the Indi-
ans. Virtually this same process of separate adjudication would 
be necessary in both the state and federal forum. In essence, 
federal court adjudication would be no more piecemeal than 
would state court adjudication. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Adsit court's holding is an expression of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's dissatisfaction with diminishing federal jurisdiction over 
Indian affairs. The court also used the case to urge clarification 
of the issue by the Supreme Court.8a At a minimum, Adsit as-
sures Indians in Montana that their reserved water rights will be 
litigated in federal court. Optimally, however, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's plea for clarification will be answered either by the Su-
preme Court or Congress. If the Supreme Court or Congress 
does not heed this plea, the Ninth Circuit has left no doubt that 
it is limiting the expansion of state power over Indian rights. 
Mark R. Peterson· 
REHNER v. RICE: STATE JURISDICTION OVER LIQUOR 
TRANSACTIONS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Rehner v. Rice, l a consolidation of three cases involving 
Indian tribes in California and Washington, the Ninth Circuit 
held that Indian tribes have exclusive licensing and distribution 
jurisdiction over liquor transactions on Indian lands.s In the Cal-
94. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 824-
25 (Stewart, J., diBBenting). 
95. The Supreme Court recently consolidated Adsit, San Carlos, and Navajo Na-
tion and granted certiorari, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982). 
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 678 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 291 (1982). 
2. 678 F.2d at 1342. 
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ifornia case,8 a federally licensed Indian trader was denied an 
exemption from a California law requiring a license for the sale 
of liquor.4 In the two cases from Washington,'! the state, seeking 
to enforce its liquor monopoly laws, seized liquor enroute to the 
Muckleshoot and Tulalip reservations.6 The Ninth Circuit held 
that 18 U.S.C. section 1161 preempts state licensing and distri-
bution jurisdiction over liquor transactions.7 Washington, how-
ever, would not be precluded from seizing liquor if the district 
court on remand found the state sales tax valid.s 
This note will examine the Ninth Circuit's use of traditional 
federal Indian preemption principles to limit state assertion of 
regulatory jurisdiction despite section 1161's requirement that 
liquor transactions be "in conformity with state law."9 The ques-
tion remains, however, whether federal preemption is sufficient 
to invalidate the state tax on liquor sales to non-tribal members 
in light of a recent Supreme Court decision validating a state 
sales tax on cigarettes sold on a reservation.10 
B. FACTS 
The California Case: Rehner v. Rice 
Eva Rehner, a federally licensed Indian trader, owned and 
operated a small general store on the Pala Reservation.11 She 
3. Rehner v. Rice, No. 77-24094 (S.O. Cal. 1977). 
4. 678 F.2d at 1342. 
5. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. State of Washington, No. C78-783V (W.O. Wash. 
1979), reprinted in 6 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) F-36 (1979) 
and Tulalip Indian Tribes v. State of Washington, No. 79-4404 (W.O. Wash. 1979). 
6. 678 F.2d at 1342. 
7. 1d. at 1349. 
8.1d. 
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976) provides: 
The provisions of sections 1154, 1156, 3133, 3488, and 3618, of 
this title, shall not apply within any area that is not Indian 
country, nor to any act or transaction within any area of In-
dian country provided such act or transaction is in conformity 
both with the laws of the State in which such act or transac-
tion occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe 
having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified 
by the Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal 
Register. 
10. Washington v. Confederate Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980). 
11. 678 F.2d at 1342. Federal law requires that any person desiring to sell goods to 
Indians inside a reservation must secure federal approval. 25 U.S.C. § 262 (1976). Such 
16
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sought an exemption from a California law requiring a liquor li-
cense for the sale of intoxicants for off-premises consumption. II 
When the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 
denied her request, she brought an action in federal district 
court for injunctive and declaratory relief.18 The district court 
dismissed her case on the ground that she failed to state a claim 
and concluded she needed a state license. If 
The Washington Cases: Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. State of 
Washington and Tulalip Indian Tribes v. State of Washington 
The Muckleshoot and Tulalip tribes passed ordinances pur-
suant to their authority under 18 U.S.C. section·U61 purporting 
to comprehensively and exclusively regulate the introduction, 
purchase, sale, licensing and taxation of liquor transactions 
within their respective boundaries. 1 I While both ordinances al-
lowed a grace period during which persons currently holding 
valid state licenses would be permitted to operate subject to ap-
plication and approval of a license from the tribal government,16 
persons are subject to extensive federal regulation. 25 C.F.R. § 140 (1982). 
12. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 23394 (West Supp. 1982) provides: "An off-sale general 
license includes the privileges specified in Section 23393 and authorizes the sale, to con-
sumers only and not for resale . . . of distilled spirits· for consumption off the premises 
where sold." 
13. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23090 (West Supp. 1982) provides that all appeals 
from decisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board be taken to the Califor-
nia Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals on a writ of review. 
14. 678 F.2d at 1342. 
15. The Muckleshoot Liquor Ordinance, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,616 (1978) states the pur-
pose of providing for the exclusive purchase and sale of liquor through tribal enterprise 
as increasing the ability of the tribal government to control reservation liquor distribu-
tion and possession and to provide for an "important" source of revenue for the contin-
ued operation of the tribal government and delivery of tribal services. Id. at § l(d). The 
ordinance specifically provides that any liquor transaction not in conformity with the 
ordinance would be subject to the federal Indian liquor laws. Id. at § 5. A Liquor Divi-
sion was created which has general regulatory power to purchase liquor, fix prices and 
collect and levy taxes. ld. at § 7. The Muckleshoot Liquor Commission was created to 
control and manage all liquor sales and Bales outlets. ld. at § 9. Finally, the ordinance 
provides that all tax revenues will be used for the reservation and tribal community with 
priority given to tribal courts and delivery of basic social services. ld. at § 10. 
The Tulalip Liquor Ordinance No. 43, 42 Fed. Reg. 46,612 (1977) also provides for 
the exclusive tribal control of the introduction, purchase, sale and taxation of liquor 
transactions. The Tulalip Liquor Commission was granted pOwer to enter into contracts, 
purchase"liquor, manage sales, and collect and issue licenses, taxes, and fees. ld. at § 6. 
The Tulalip Liquor Store was created as the tribal outlet for sales. Id. at § 8. All revenue 
is to be remitted to the general fund of the Tulalip Tribes. Id. at § 7. 
16. Muckleshoot Liquor Ordinance, supra note 15, at § 5; Tulalip Liquor Ordinance, 
supra note 15, at § 6. Both ordinances provide that Washington state substantive "stan-
17
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neither the tribes nor their subordinates applied for a liquor li-
cense from the Washington State Liquor Control Board. 
The State of Washington holds a monopoly over all liquor 
sales within state boundaries so that liquor must be sold through 
state authorized stores. 1' The revenue earned is distributed to 
local governments, but not to Indian tribal governments.1S In 
1978, the Liquor Control Board seized shipments of liquor en-
route to the Muckleshoot and Tulalip reservations claiming that 
its liquor monopoly laws and the state sales taxes extended to 
reservation liquor transactions. 18 
The tribes brought actions in federal district court for in-
junctive relief, and Washington counterclaimed for injunctive 
and monetary relief.lIo The district court held that the tribes ex-
ercise exclusive regulatory jurisdicton over liquor transactions on 
Indian reservations, and enjoined the state from seizing liquor 
enroute to the reservations. The court then granted summary 
judgment in favor of the tribes on Washington's counterclaim. III 
dards" are applicable: 
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to supercede the 
substantive laws of the State of Washington effective within 
the exterior boundaries of the Tulalip Indian Reservaton and, 
where not inconsistent herewith, the substantive standards of 
the criminal laws of the State of Washington regarding sale, 
consumption and use of liquor shall apply. 
Tulalip Ordinance No. 43, 42 Fed. Reg. 46,612 (1977). 
17. WASH. REv. CODE § 66.32.010 (1974) provides: "Except as permitted by the 
board, no liquor shall be kept or had by any person within this state unle88 the package 
in which the liquor was contained had, while containing that liquor, been sealed with the 
official seal adopted by the board . . . ." 
18. 678 F.2d at 1343. 
19. The Muckleshoot and Tulalip tribes contracted with the Central Liquor Com-
pany, a federally licensed distributor located in Oklahoma City for the purchase of li-
quor. The liquor seized was enroute from Oklahoma City. rd. at 1342. 
20. 678 F.2d at 1343. 
21. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v .. Washington, No. C78·783V (W.D. Wash., 1979). 
Subsequent to this decision, the Washington Court of Appeals in Washington ex rei. 
Maleng v. Ankeen District Court, No. 10351·2·1 (Wash. Ct. App., May 5, 1982), reo 
printed in 9 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW TRAINING PROGRAM) 5062 (1982) upheld the 
conviction of persons who purchased and transported liquor outside the reservation in 
violation of WASH. REv. CODE § 66.44.160 (1974) which makes it illegal to p08se88 liquor 
not sold through a government authorized store. The court noted that the Muckleshoot 
decision had only enjoined the state from seizing liquor enroute to the reservation, but it 
also pointed out that its decision was narrow in that defendants had not raised the issue 
of whether WASH. REv. CODE § 66.44.160 (1974) was in conflict with congressional ple-
nary authority to regulate commerce among the Indian tribes pursuant to Art. I, § 8 of 
18
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C. BACKGROUND 
Application of State Liquor Laws under 18 U.S.C. section 1161 
The Rehner court was required to examine section 1161's 
provision that Indian liquor transactions be "in conformity both 
with the laws of the state in which such act or transaction occurs 
and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdic-
tion,"1111 to determine if Congress intended that state licensing 
and monopoly laws applied. 
In 1953, Congress passed section 1161 to permit the in-
troducton of liquor in Indian country.lIS Congress, early in its 
history, had enacted prohibitions against the introduction, sale, 
and possession of liquor in Indian country.24 These prohibitions 
remained in effect twenty years after the twenty-first amend-
ment2& ended the prohibition era and repealed federal criminal 
penalties for the transportation and use of liquor within the 
states. Congress, with the enactment of section 1161, condition-
ally lifted these prohibitions. 
The sparse legislative history of this law suggests that the 
primary intent of the legislation was to end what the Indians 
claimed was unfair discrimination. lie Section 1161 allows a state 
or local municipality or Indian tribe, if either so desires, and by 
enactment of proper legislation or ordinance, to restrict the sales 
the United States Constitution. See infra note 33. 
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976). See supra note 9 for text. 
23. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-277, ch. 502 § 267, 67 Stat. 586 (1953) 
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976». 
;'4. These prohibitions are now codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1156. 3113, and 3488 
(1976). Since 1834 federal law had penalized both the introduction of liquor into Indian 
country and the operation of distilleries therein. Possession of liquor was made a sepa-
rate offense in 1918. For a detailed history of congressional action over liquor transac-
tions, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 306-07 (1982). 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 provides: "The transportation or importation into 
any State, Territory or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of 
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof. is hereby prohibited." 
26. S. REP. No. 722, 83d Cong., 1st Sass., reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 2399, 2400. In the "Explanation to the Bill" contained in the report, it was noted 
that Indians had complained that it was unfair to legislate specifically against them. 
regardless of the merits of prohibition. Section 1161 was enacted at the same time as 
other legislation aimed specifically at ending certain discriminatory laws against Indians. 
See Letter from Orme Lewis, Asst. Secretary of the Interior, to the Chairman of the 
House Committee on Interior Insular Affairs (July 7, 1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2400. 
19
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of intoxicants to Indians.27 Neither the Act nor its legislative 
history, however, gives insight into Congress' intent concerning 
enforcement jurisdiction and the applicability of state licensing 
and monopoly schemes. 
Although the Interior Solicitor had indicated, in 1954, that 
an Indian desiring to operate a bar on a reservation would have 
to obtain a state license,ss the Solicitor held officially in 1971S9 
that the state of Montana did not have enforcement or licensing 
jurisdiction over Indians operating liquor establishments on a 
reservation.80 Two federal courts have held that reservation In-
dians need not obtain a state liquor license to sell liquor within 
the reservation.81 
27. S. REP. No. 722, supra note 26, at 2400. 
28. Letter from the Interior Solicitor to John W. Stilley of the Arizona State Legis-
lature (March 26, 1954), cited in 2 OP. SOLICITOR 2026, 2029 (1974). 
29. Memorandum from Interior Solicitor to Comm'r of Indian Affairs (Feb. 3, 1971), 
reprinted in 2 OP. SOLICITOR 2026 (1974). 
30. The Chippewa Tribe passed an ordinance in conformity with section 1161 au-
thorizing liquor on the reservation. The tribe then applied for a liquor license from the 
Montana Liquor Control Board but there were no licenses available under the Montana 
quota system. The Solicitor held that had Congress intended to impose state enforce-
ment jurisdiction, it could have done so expressly. The Solicitor concluded that Congress 
intended that state law should be used as a "standard of measurement" to define lawful 
and unlawful activity on the reservation. Any act not in conformity with state law would 
invoke federal penalties which had been conditionally lifted by section 1161. 1d. at 2027. 
The Solicitor noted that Justice Black, in dicta, in Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State 
Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685, 687 n.3 (1965), referred to section 1161 as permitting 
application of state liquor law "standards." 2 OP. SOLICITOR at 2027 n.l. The Solicitor 
also held that the tribe had, as an attribute of its inherent sovereign power, the right to 
license a subordinate entity or tribal member to operate a liquor establishment on the 
reservation. The imposition of a state liquor license requirement on these entities would 
be an unlawful infringement of the reservation Indians' right to tribal self-government. 
1d. at 2028. 
31. Zaste v. North Dakota, No. Al-75-29 (D.N.D., June 21, 1977), reprinted in 4 
INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) F-128 (1977). Plaintiff was an en-
rolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians and possessed a li-
cense from the Turtle Mountain Tribal Council for on and off premises sale of liquor. 
The Turtle Mountain Tribal Council had enacted a comprehensive liquor control ordi-
nance. The court in its conclusions of law found that Congress had exclusive authority to 
regulate liquor transactions within Indian country. That power was delegated to and ex-
ercised by the tribes through section 1161. The section did not constitute consent to. the 
states requiring Indian retailers to obtain licenses to sell liquor within Indian country. As 
a result, the North Dakota code was in conflict with federal law and was inapplicable to 
Indian liquor retailers. 1d. at F-128-29. The court held that the holder of a valid tribal 
license does not need a state liquor license. 
On facts substantially similar to Rehner, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. New 
Mexico, 590 F.2d 323 (1Oth Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 634 (1979), held that the 
state of New Mexico could not require a tribe to obtain a state liquor license in order to 
20
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In United States v. Mazurie,32 the Supreme Court, examin-
ing section 1161 in the context of tribal licensing authority, held 
that Congress, through section 1161, had delegated a portion of 
its plenary power over Indian liquor transactions to the tribes.33 
The tribes, therefore, were empowered to require non-Indians 
operating a liquor establishment on the reservation to obtain a 
tribal license.34 The Court never reached the issue of a state li-
censing requirement because the bar owners were non-Indians 
admittedly subject to state law and the tribes had by ordinance 
required that a state license also be obtained.311 
There has been no federal court ruling with respect to state 
liquor monopoly laws. The Associate Solicitor, however, issued 
an opinion in 1976 which found that Idaho's liquor monopoly 
laws were not applicable under section 1161.36 The Associate So-
licitor stated that state substantive standards were applicable. 
Only the tribe had the sovereign authority to determine which 
class of persons were permitted to make sales and to whom state 
operate a bar on the reservation. The court held that the tribe had sole jurisdiction over 
tribal-owned liquor outlets. It concluded that section 1161 did not constitute consent for 
New Mexico to extend its regulatory jurisdiction over liquor transactions on the reserva-
tion. Id. at 329. The court also noted that the trial court found that due to state quota 
restrictions, the cost of a license would be $50,000 and would place a financial burden on 
the Tribe. Id. at 325. 
32. 419 U.S. 544 (1975). 
33. The Court noted that Article I, § 8 of the Constitution gives Congress power 
"(tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes." 419 U.S. at 554. It also noted that the Court had repeatedly held 
that this clause affords Congress the power to prohibit or regulate the sale of alcoholic 
beverages to Indians, and to prohibit or regulate the introducton of alcoholic beverages 
into Indian country. Id. 
34. Id. at 557. It was argued that Congress could not delegate its power to regulate 
liquor transactions to the tribes. The Supreme Court held that the tribes' independent 
authority and special status with the United States was sufficient to protect Congress' 
decision to vest in tribal councils a portion of its plenary authority to "regulate com-
merce ... with Indian Tribes." 
35. The bar owners argued that they were non-Indians operating a bar on privately 
owned land within the reservation and therefore came within an exception provided in 
federal liquor laws for "fee-patented lands in non-Indian communities." 18 U.S.C. § 
1154(c) (1976). The bar owners argued that they were in such a community, or, in the 
alternative, that the exception was unconstitutionally vague. The Court rejected these 
arguments, finding that the language was sufficient to advise them that they were subject 
to Indian licensing requirements. The Court noted that Congress had always had the 
authority to define "Indian country" broadly and to supersede state jurisdiction within 
the defined area. 419 U.S. at 555. 
36. Letter from the Assoc. Solicitor for Indian Affairs, Dep't of the Interior, to Chief 
Counsel, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Dep't of the Treasury (January 22, 
1976), reprinted in 4 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) i-I (1976). 
21
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standards were to apply. The opinion pointed out that both li-
censing and monopoly laws have the effect of determining who 
will be allowed to engage in wholesale or retail sales on the res-
ervation. This right, however, was vested in the tribes under sec-
tion 1161.37 
Preemption of State Laws by Federal Laws and Treaties Gov-
erning Indian Affairs 
Outside of express grants of jurisdiction to the states, or in 
cases where statutes are ambiguous, the Supreme Court has had 
to decide each assertion of state power on a case-by-case basis. 
In its decisions, the Court has used either an infringement anal-
ysis or a preemption analysis to determine the applicability of 
state laws to Indians. 
The infringement test, first enunciated in Williams v. Lee,s8 
states that "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has 
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by 
them."s9 
The term "preemption" was first employed by the Supreme 
Court in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission.40 Its basic 
premise is that the federal purposes of Indian treaties and stat-
utes are broadly preemptive of state law even in the absence of 
explicit language oU~':ing state jurisdiction.u Thus, it has been 
stated that "the purpose of protecting tribal self-government 
preempts state laws which would otherwise govern the relations 
of Indians with one another, prescribe standards of criminal con-
duct and punishment, and impose regulations and taxes."42 
The McClanahan Court articulated the doctrine as requir-
ing a careful examination of all relevant statutes and treaties 
coupled with a recognition of traditional tribal sovereignty and a 
37. [d. at i-2. 
38. 358 U.S. 217 (1958). 
39. [d. at 220. 
40. 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). 
41. For a detailed discussion comparing general federal preemption with preemption 
in Indian law, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 270-79 (1982). 
42. [d. at 275. 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/14
1983] INDIAN LAW 351 
congressional policy of freeing Indians from state control. 43 If no 
preemption of state law is found from the language or the pur-
poses of the statutes and treaties, the court must then balance 
the tribe's interests in self-government against legitimate state 
interests.44 State laws may be enforced against non-Indians "up 
to the point where tribal self-government would be affected."46 
The McClanahan Court developed several rules of construc-
tion to determine the scope of preemption. Preemption should 
give effect to the plenary and exclusive power of the federal gov-
ernment to regulate Indian affairs even against interference by 
the state.4& State law will not apply to tribal Indians unless Con-
gress has expressly provided that state law shall apply.47 Ambi-
guities in the law will usually be resolved in favor of the tribes.4& 
Determinations in favor of the Indians can be supported by a 
long standing policy of leaving Indians free from state control.'" 
The fact that Congress has acted consistently on the assumption 
that states have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on 
the reservation should be recognized. &0 
The McClanahan Court noted that the trend is toward a 
reliance on federal preemption to invalidate state law rather 
than toward Indian sovereignty.&1 Although the Court as re-
cently as 1980 has stated that both federal preemption and in-
fringement of tribal self-government are independent barriers to 
the assertion of state law,&2 it has only invalidated state law 
43. 411 U.S. 164, 174. 
44. [d. at 171. 
45. [d. at 179. It was argued that the state law at issue should be upheld because it 
did not actually infringe upon tribal self-government. The Court rejected this argument, 
stating that the Williams infringement test should be applied to the activities of non-
Indians on the reservation. [d. at 140. 
46. The Court later explained the McClanahan principles in Bryan v. Itasca 
County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976). 
47. [d., citing McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168. 
48. 411 U.S. at 174. 
49. [d. at 169. 
50. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 376 n.2. 
51. 411 U.S. at 172. 
52. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 44S U.S. 136, 143 (1980). The Court 
held that federal preemption and infringement of tribal self-government are independent 
barriers, either of which, "standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law 
inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members." [d. The 
Court noted, however, that the two tests are related in that "the right of tribal self-
government is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of Congress." [d. 
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where it found overriding federal activity in a given subject 
matter. lIS 
State Taxation Cases 
The Supreme Court clearly has relied on federal preemption 
principles to invalidate state tax schemes imposed on reserva-
tion activities. Where the subject matter is comprehensively reg-
ulated by federal law , the Court will generally invalidate the tax. 
The clearest example of such federal preemption was in Warren 
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission, G4 where the Supreme 
court held that Arizona could not tax the gross receipts of a non-
Indian trading post on the Navajo reservation.GG The Court 
pointed out that Indian traders were federally licensed and sub-
ject to extensive federal regulation.G6 The Court therefore con-
cluded that "Congress has taken the business of Indian trading 
on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state 
laws imposing additional burdens upon traders."G7 
In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,GS the 
Court held that the state of Arizona could not impose an income 
tax on an Indian whose income was derived solely from the res-
ervation, in the absence of express congressional authorization. G9 
The Court stated, however, that when the state has a legitimate 
interest in regulating the affairs of non-Indians, that interest 
must be accomodated, at least to the point where Indian tribal 
self-government would be affected.60 
53. Compare White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980) 
(invalidating a state motor carrier license and fuel use tax as preempted by extensive 
federal regulations over timber operations on Indian reservations) and Central Mach. Co. 
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 165 (1980) (invalidating state sales tax on 
the sale of farm equipment to an Indian Tribe as preempted by federal Indian trader 
statutes) with Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) and 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
54. 380 U.S. 685 (1965). 
55. Id. at 690. 
56.Id. 
57.Id. 
58. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
59. Id. at 171. 
60. Id. at 179. The McClanahan Court distinguished situations involving Indians 
and non-Indians. Where state law affected Indians, careful scrutiny of the applicable 
statutes and treaties was required to determine if federal law preempted state law. It was 
argued in the court below that Arizona could impose its taxes because the tribe's right to 
self-government was unimpaired. The Court limited the Williams infringement test to 
situations involving non-Indians. In those cases, the states had a legitimate authority 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/14
1983] INDIAN LAW 353 
Thus, in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,s1 
the Court validated a sales tax on the sale of cigarettes to non-
Indians when the legal incidence of the tax fell on the non-In-
dian purchaser.s2 In Moe, the state of Montana attempted to im-
pose personal property taxes on Indians and a cigarette vendor's 
license fee on tribal members selling cigarettes on the reserva-
tion. It also sought to require the tribe members to precollect a 
cigarette sales tax on all sales. The Court invalidated all taxes 
imposed directly on Indians, but validated the tax on sales to 
non-Indians.ss 
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Res-
ervation (Colville),s. the Court refused to distinguish Moe from 
a situation where the tribe was also imposing its own sales tax. 
The Court upheld the tribes' power to tax as a fundamental at-
tribute of self-government.slI Both the tribes and state, however, 
were free to impose their own tax schemes." In dicta, the Court 
admitted that the tribes might preempt the state power to tax 
through a properly delegated federal power to do so, but such a 
delegation was not to be inferred by the mere approval by the 
federal government of the Indian tax ordinances. S7 
over their citizens. The tribes had authority over their own citizens and also had an 
interest in Il8serting authority over non-Indians present within their territory. The Court 
concluded that the Williams test WIl8 designed to resolve the conflict in favor of the 
Indians by holding that the state could "protect its interest up to the point where tribal 
government would be affected." Id. 
61. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
62. [d. at 467-68. 
63. Id. at 482: The Court's rationale WIl8 that the tax WIl8 paid by the consumer, who 
did not enjoy a tax immunity. The tribal smokeshop WIl8 merely precollecting the tax. 
The Court held this WIl8 a minimal burden justified by the state's interest in collecting 
its valid tax. I d. 
64. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
65. Id. at 152. 
66. Id. at 158. The tribes argued that their involvement in the operation and taxa-
tion of cigarette sales should oust the state. The Court rejected this argument, stating 
that tribes, like all other state residents, are not exempt from state taxes on market 
gOods. Id. at 155. The tribes also argued that a double taxation would result in a loss of 
revenue to the tribes. The Court held that W Il8hington did not infringe on tribal self-
government because the tax would deprive the tribes of revenue. Id. at 156. 
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, argued that there WIl8 an infringement on 
tribal self-government. The dissent argued that there WIl8 an actual conflict of jurisdic-
tion and sovereignty because the tax would inject state law into a transaction which the 
Indians had chosen to subject to their own laws. The tribes were forced to make a choice 
between exercising their right to tax (and losing revenues) and refraining from their right 
to tax in order to stay competitive. Id. at 173. 
67. Id. at 156. 
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In two companion cases decided the same year, the dissent-
ing judges in Colville were able to gather a majority to invalidate 
state taxes imposed on non-Indians doing business on the reser-
vation. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,6S the 
Court invalidated a state motor carrier tax imposed on a non-
Indian contractor who cut timber on a reservation and trans-
ported it to an Indian sawmill. The Court found that the exten-
sive federal regulations applying to timber operations in Indian 
country preempted the state tax.6e Similarly, in Central Ma-
chinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission,"o the Court in-
validated a state gross receipts tax imposed on a non-Indian 
business,'1l holding that extensive federal regulation over Indian 
trading preempted taxation on the sale of machinery to the 
tribe. '12 
D. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
State Licensing and Distribution Jurisdiction over Indian 
Country Liquor Transactions 
Washington and California argued that Congress had ex-
pressly delegated regulatory as well as substantive authority to 
the states through section 1161.'18 The Ninth Circuit began its 
analysis by setting out a basic preemption framework. The court 
noted that the federal government has a long history of legisla-
tion and control over Indian reservation liquor transactions."4 In 
light of this history of pervasive control, the court found that 
there could be no ground for concluding that Congress had re-
moved its "veil of preemption" unless section 1161 expressly au-
68. 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 
69. [d. at 151. The Court noted that revenue from the timber operations is used to 
undertake a wide variety of measures to ensure the productivity of the forest, including 
reforestation, fire control, wildlife promotion, road improvement, safety inspections, and 
general policing of the forest. On the other hand, the state failed to show any legitimate 
regulatory interest or governmental function to be performed for those on whom the 
taxes fall. [d. at 150. Furthermore, the Court noted that there is a current federal policy 
of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development. [d. at 143. The dissent 
argued that the taxes imposed did not substantially reduce tribal revenues and the ma-
jority had only assumed an interference with federal purpose. [d. at 159. 
70. 448 U.S. 160 (1980). 
71. [d. at 165. 
72. [d. at 150-51. 
73. See supra note 9 for text of 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976) 
74. 678 F.2d at 1343. 
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thorized state jurisdiction. 'III The court then outlined its basic 
rules of construction according to the McClanahan guidelines.'I6 
Washington and California pointed to the grammatical 
structure of section 1161, arguing that section 1161 requires li-
quor transactions to conform to state as well as triballaw.'I'I The 
court rejected this argument, however, stating that Washington 
placed too much emphasis on the isolated phrase "laws of the 
state." If "laws of the state" implicitly permitted exclusive state 
licensing and distribution jurisdiction, then the grammatical 
logic of the statute would require the implicit inclusion of a sim-
ilar jurisdictional component in the phrase "ordinance duly 
adopted by the tribe." This construction would lead to the "un-
likely result that a licensing and distribution monopoly could 
vest in both the state and the tribes. "'18 The court noted that 
grants of power to the state must be express, while tribal power 
over internal affairs is inherent and exists without a grant from 
Congress. The court concluded that it was more likely that Con-
gress intended that the tribes have licensing and distribution 
power, not the states. '19 
The court then looked at the modifying clauses in section 
1161.80 The phrase modifying "laws of the state" contained no 
jurisdictional reference. On the other hand, "ordinance duly 
adopted by the tribe" was followed by the phrase "having juris-
diction over such area of Indian country." The court noted that 
Congress could have substituted the phrase "laws of the state 
having jurisdiction" and could have deleted any reference to tri-
bal jurisdiction to achieve a clearer result had it intended to 
cQnfer jurisdiction to the states. On this basis, the court con-
cluded that Congress only intended that the state function as a 
source of law to be applied by the tribal government.81 
In support of this construction, the court compared the lan-
guage of section 1161 with the Termination Acts8! and Public 
75. [d. 
76. [d. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50. 
77. [d. at 1344. See supra note 9 for text of the statute. 
78. [d. 
79. [d. 
80. [d. at 1345. 
81. [d. 
82. 25 U.S.C. § 726 (1976) states: 
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Law 280,88 which were passed concurrently. Both statutes illus-
trated that Congress knew how to employ precise language to 
transfer jurisdiction when it wished to use such language. The 
court also examined the Assimilative Crimes Act8• and the Ma-
jor Crimes Act,811 both of which employ language similar to sec-
tion 1161. Both intended that state substantive law be incorpo-
rated into federal law. Federal courts, however, retained 
jurisdiction over the crimes covered by the acts.86 
The court concluded that section 1161 was at best ambigu-
OUS.87 Since ambiguities should be interpreted in favor of the 
tribes,88 the court determined that there was insufficient evi-
dence to show that Congress intended section 1161 to confer reg-
ulatory or licensing jurisdiction over on-reservation liquor traffic 
to the states.89 
[A]ll statutes of the United States which affect Indians be-
cause of their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to 
the Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas or the members 
thereof, . . . and the laws of the several States shall apply to 
the tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply 
to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction. 
83. The most pervasive transfer of federal jurisdiction to the states was contained in 
Public Law 280 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1360(a), 1162(a) (1976» which was enacted 
during a period where Congress' policy was to terminate federal jurisdiction over the 
tribes and to transfer responsibility to the states. The law granted civil and criminal 
jurisdiction to certain voluntary states and permitted other states to assume jurisdiction 
under certain conditions. In Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), the Supreme 
Court held that Public Law 280 granted states jurisdiction over civil causes of action, 
that the primary intent of the law was to provide a judicial forum for disputes involving 
Indians, and that the law did not confer upon the states the right to extend their regula-
tory power over Indian reservations. [d. at 384. 
84. The Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), provides that state substan-
tive law be incorporated for prosecutions of offenses committed in federal jurisdictions. 
The statute reads in pertinent part: 
Whoever . . . is guilty of any act or omission which, although 
not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be 
punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of 
the State, Territory, P088ession, or District in which such 
place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of 
such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and sub-
ject to a like punishment. 
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976). Under this Act, the federal courts have jurisdiction over 
certain crimes, but the laws of the state are incorporated for crimes (such as burglary 
and incest) for which there are no federal counterparts. 
86. 678 F.2d at 1347. 
87. [d. at 1348. 
88. [d. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174. 
89. 678 F.2d at 1348. 
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The court finally noted that Congress did require that no 
tribal ordinance be effective unless it was certified by the Secre-
tary of the Interior. This indicated that the regulatory authority 
of the tribes was to be safeguarded by federal supervision. Re-
ferring to the Supreme Court's analysis in Warren Trading Post 
v. Arizona, the court reasoned that it was "presented with a con-
gressional scheme in which comprehensive tribal ordinances and 
Department of Interior certification procedures are 'in them-
selves sufficient to show that Congress has taken . . . business 
. . . so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws impos-
ing additional burdens . . . .' "90 These comprehensive schemes 
and regulations were evidence that section 1161 preempts state 
licensing and distribution jurisdicton.91 
State Taxation of Liquor Sales to Non-tribal Members 
Turning to the question of whether Washington could im-
pose a sales tax on Indian liquor sales, the court noted that the 
federal district court had issued its injunction against further 
state seizures of liquor shipments without deciding the issue of 
state taxes.92 On appeal, Washington argued that Colville per-
mitted state taxation of retail sales to non-tribal members.9s 
The Rehner panel stated that Colville resolved two issues. 
First, state taxation of sales to non-tribal Indians was neither 
preempted by nor contrary to principles of tribal self-govern-
ment. Second, a state's interest in enforcing its valid sales tax 
was sufficient to justify seizure of cigarette shipments traveling 
to the reservation if the tribes failed to comply with state collec-
tion procedures.94 The Rehner court ruled that it was improper 
for the district court to have granted an injunction without hav-
ing first determining the validity of the tax.90 Since Colville had 
not been decided when the district court issued its decision, the 
decision would be reversed and remanded for a hearing on the 
validity of the tax. ge 
90. Id. at 1349, quoting Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 
U.S. 685, 689-91. 
91. 678 F.2d at 1349. 
92.Id. 
93. 447 U.S. at 154-59. 
94. 678 F.2d 1349-50. 
95. Id. at 1349. 
96. Id. The court noted that beyond reversing the district court's grant of perma-
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The Dissent 
Judge Goodwin in his dissenting opinion stated that the re-
sult reached by the majority was equitable.s7 He concluded, 
however, that the decision did not seem consistent with the text 
of the law or its legislative history.s8 The dissent argued that 
when the twenty-first amendment was passed, the regulatory in-
terests of the states were protected. When Congress passed sec-
tion 1161, it intended to give Indians parity with the rest of the 
nation, but did not intend to confer greater rights upon the Indi-
ans. ss In monopoly states, Indians would have the freedom to 
buy and import liquor at free market prices whereas other citi-
zens would have to purchase liquor at government prices in gov-
ernment stores. IOO He concluded that while the majority's policy 
favoring the Indians was correct, it was not supported by section 
1161. Rather, it is Congress' task to change the law to conform 
with this policy.lol 
E. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit relied on a preemption analysis to find 
that Congress had not granted regulatory authority to the states 
through section 1161. The court reasoned that had Congress 
wished to grant licensing and distribution "jurisdiction" to the 
states, It could have expressly done so. While Washington and 
California simply argued that "state laws" include all state laws, 
both substantive and regulatory, the court, in a strained dissec-
tion of the statutory language, found that section 1161's refer-
ence to state law lacked a jurisdictional component. The court 
nent injunctive relief, it would not rule on the merits of the following questions: (1) 
whether Washington's sales tax on sales to non-tribal members, with or without credit 
given to tribal sales taxes, is preempted or violative of tribal self-government; or, (2) 
whether Washington may impose recordkeeping requirements upon the tribes pursuant 
to the valid state taxing power. [d. In Part III of its opinion, the court rejected the 
state's argument that the twenty-first amendment permits state liquor licensing on In-
dian reservations. [d. at 1350. In Part IV of the opinion, the court held that Washing-
ton's counterclaim was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Section 1161 did 
not subject the tribes to suits for declaratory or injunctive relief. The tribes, by suing for 
injunctive relief, did not waive their sovereign immunity and consent to suit. A state 
cannot compel a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity by simply seizing goods owned by 
the tribes. [d. at 1351-52. 
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concluded that given this ambiguity, it would find in favor of the 
tribes. 
Basic to the court's analysis, however, was that the licensing 
and monopoly laws were "regulatory" rather than substantive. 
Washington contended that its liquor monopoly was a substan-
tive standard of conduct designed to discourage liquor consump-
tion. The court refused to address this issue because Washington 
had failed to raise it at trial. Therefore, the .court gave no guide-
lines to resolve cases where a state asserts its power as a sub-
stantive standard of conduct. 
It would have been helpful had the court distinguished be-
tween policy and devices to implement policy. Thus, while the 
states could formulate policy that governs the nature and extent 
of liquor transactions, the tribes would be vested with the au-
thority to implement that policy. As devices to implement pol-
icy, licensing and monopoly laws would be attributes of Indian 
self-government. 
By relying on a preemption analysis, the court did not have 
to reach the issue of infringement of tribal powers which is in 
itself a bar to the application of state law. The court found it 
unnecessary to determine whether inherent tribal sovereignty in-
dependently excludes state licensing and monopoly laws.102 The 
Supreme Court in White Mountain Apache Tribe u. Bracker 
noted that the right of "tribal self-government is ultimately de-
pendent on and subject to the broad power of Congress. "103 The 
Court had already ruled in United States u. Mazurie that Con-
gress had delegated its plenary power of Indian country liquor 
transactions to the tribes.104 Given the assertion of that power 
by the Muckleshoot and Tulalip tribes to regulate and tax liquor 
transactions,lOG a clear conflict between state and tribal interests 
existed. McClanahan could have been invoked to hold state law 
inapplicable because the "point where tribal interests are af-
fected" had been reached. The Muckleshoot and Tulalip ordi-
nances, moreover, expressly stated that only state substantive 
standards would apply. State assertions of regulatory laws would 
102. 678 F.2d at 1352. 
103. 448 U.S. at 143. 
104. 419 U.S. at 554. 
105. See supra note 15. 
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be in conflict with the tribes' express desire not to have those 
laws apply. Once the conflict appears, state law should defer to 
tribal law. 
The Ninth Circuit may have had another motive in relying 
on preemption principles. In White Mountain Apache Tribel06 
and Central Machinery CO.,IO'7 the Supreme Court invalidated 
taxes on non-Indian businesses because they engaged in activi-
ties on the reservation which were heavily regulated by federal 
law. Moreover, the Colville Court, citing United States v. 
Mazurie,108 admitted that a tribe may preempt a state's power 
to tax by a properly delegated power to do so. In Mazurie, the 
Court found that Congress had delegated a portion of its plenary 
power over Indian liquor transactions to the tribes.loe By finding 
that Indian liquor transactions were subject to comprehensive 
tribal schemes and federal regulation which preempted intrusion 
by state licensing and distribution laws, the district court would 
be left with no choice but to make a similar finding with respect 
to state taxation. 
Left unstated by most of the decisions on licensing and tax-
ation are the financial consequences of a decision in favor of the 
tribes or states. Licensing and monopoly schemes, as well as tax-
ation, serve as sources of revenues for the states. A finding in 
favor of the tribes might lead to a significant reduction of reve-
nues to the states if the tribes were able to sell at lower than 
market prices. This was certainly the concern of the Supreme 
Court in Moe and Colville. On the other hand, a finding in favor 
of the state would, as the majority pointed out in White Moun-
tain, deprive the Indian tribes of a valuable source of revenue 
and defeat Congress' policy of tribal self-determinaton and com-
mercial development. 110 
While the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly weigh these un-
derlying considerations, the result it reached is correct since, as 
the Court noted in White Mountain, "traditional notions of In-
dian self government are so deeply ingrained in our jurispru-
106. 448 U.S. at 150. 
107. [d. at 165. 
108. 447 U.S. at 156. 
109. 419 U.S. at 554. 
110. 448 U.S. at 143. 
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dence that they have provided an important 'backdrop' against 
which vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be 
measured. "l11 
May Lee Tong· 
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIAN LAW 
A. SOVEREIGN POWER TO IMPOSE CIVIL REGULATIONS ON NON-IN-
DIANS WITHIN THE RESERVATION 
In Cardin v. De La Cruz, 1 the Ninth Circuit held that an 
Indian tribe had "inherent sovereign power" to impose its build-
ing, health and safety regulations over a non-Indian's business 
within the reservation.1II In addition, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that jurisdiction to decide such an issue was clearly a fed-
eral question because the action was based on "federal common 
law."s 
The district court had enjoined the tribe from enforcing its 
building, health and safety regulations against the plaintiff,· re-
lying on the Supreme Court decision of Oliphant v. Suquamish. II 
In reversing, the Ninth Circuit disapproved of the lower court's 
broad reading of Oliphant.8 
111. [d. 
• Third year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were 
Poole, J. and Kellam, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 293 (1982). 
2. 671 F.2d at 364. 
3. [d. at 365. The "federal common law" referred to results from principles not 
found in any "specific statute or treaty" and therefore falls within the federal-question 
jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). [d. See also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 
U.S. 91, 100 (1972). 
4. Plaintiff, a non-Indian, owns a grocery store within the Quinault Indian Reserva-
tion. The tribe met with him when he purchased the store to discuss measures to correct 
alleged dangerous and unsanitary conditions. The plaintiff failed to remedy the alleged 
defects before opening the store and the tribe obtained an injunction from the tribal 
court closing the store. The plaintiff filed this action in the district court to enjoin the 
tribe from regulating his business. 671 F.2d at 364-65. 
5. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
6. 671 F.2d at 365-66. 
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The plaintiff argued that: (1) the federal courts had jurisdic-
tion pursuant to statute,7 (2) tribal power to regulate non-Indi-
ans within the reservation was controlled by Oliphant, and, (3) 
regulation of non-Indians within the reservation could only be 
the result of a consensual relationship when the activity being 
regulated is one that has a "direct effect on the health or welfare 
of the tribe."8 The defendants argued that jurisdiction of the 
matter fell within the inherent sovereign power of the tribe and 
that the recent Supreme Court decision, Montana v. United 
States,9 was controlling. ) 
In a brief decision, the Ninth Circuit upheld the tribe's 
power to enforce its regulations based upon the Montana guide-
lines. After citing a series of High Court cases in support of tri-
bal sovereign powers/o the Cardin court held that the "[t]ribe's 
exercise of civil jurisdiction . . . belongs to both of the broad 
categories" defined in Montana.ll In essence the appellate court 
was persuaded that the tribe was regulating an activity that 
"threatens or has some effect on. . . the health or welfare of the 
tribe."12 
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that Oliphant concerned 
only the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts, and had no effect 
on Indian civil or regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians. IS The 
panel stated that any other reading of Oliphant would "reduce 
to a nullity the Supreme Court's repeated assertions that Indian 
tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over their territory, not 
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1982) provides in part that jurisdiction is granted to the 
district courts over "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States." 
8. 671 F.2d at 366. 
9. 450 U.S. 544, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 9ll (1981). The plaintiff also asserted that 
the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. ll9, 24 Stat. 388, had impliedly withdrawn tribal 
jurisdiction. This was rejected without much discussion by the Cardin court. 671 F.2d at 
367 n.5, citing Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 952 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 
U.S. 599. 
10. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S.Ct. 894 (1982) (tribal severance tax im-
posed on oil and gas extracted by non-Indians from leased reservation land); Washington 
v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (power to 
tax non-Indian purchasers of goods on reservation); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) 
(exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts over civil suits by a non-Indian against reservation 
arising out of transaction on reservation). 
ll. 671 F.2d at 366. 
12. [d., quoting Montana, supra note 9, at 566. 
13. 671 F.2d at 365. 
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just their members.IIl4 
In dicta, the Ninth Circuit addressed the plaintiff's argu-
ment that a "consensual relationship" and "direct effect on ... 
the health or welfare of the tribe" are necessary to regulate non-
Indians within the reservation. The Cardin court found that be-
cause the regulation of plaintiff's business was" 'an exercise of 
legitimate sovereign authority,' it cannot be overturned because 
of [plaintiff's] non-consent."l11 However, the Montana guide-
lines, relied upon by the Ninth Circuit, define a legitimate sover-
eign power as one which results from the existence of a "consen-
sual relationship."lo 
Apparently the Ninth Circuit was persuaded that a consen-
sual relationship did in fact exist or was not relevant to the deci-
sion because the other criteria evidencing a "legitimate sovereign 
authority" were present.l'7 In any event the panel rejected the 
argument that both criteria need be present simultaneously. 
Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, Indian tribes retain the power to 
impose civil regulations on the activities of a non-Indian on fee 
lands within the reservation. This decision is a further step in 
the progression of cases giving tribes "civil and regulatory juris-
diction over non-Indiansll18 within tribal lands. 
B. IMPLICIT RECOGNITION OF EXPANDED CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
In United States u. Bowman,19 the Ninth Circuit held that 
an Indian charged with an enumerated crime under the Major 
Crimes Act of 188520 could be convicted of and sentenced to a 
lesser included offense. n Defendant, an Indian, was charged 
14. [d. at 366. 
15. 671 F.2d at 367. See also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe. 102 S. Ct. 894 
(1982). 
16. 671 F.2d at 366. 
17. [d. at 367. The other criterion found in the Montana decision is that the exer-
cise of "civil authority ... threatens or has some direct effect on the ... health or 
welfare of the tribe." 450 U.S. 544. 566. 
18. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
19. 679 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Schroeder. J.; the other panel members were 
Wallace. J .• and Henderson. D.J .• sitting by designation. dissenting) (rehearing and re-
hearing en banc denied. Aug. 13. 1982). 
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1977). 
21. The same result was reached in United States v. John. 587 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 
1979) and United States v. Felicia. 495 F.2d 353 (8th Cir.). cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 
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with assault resulting in serious bodily injury, one of the crimes 
specifically enumerated in the Major Crimes Act.22 At trial, de-
fendant requested and received a jury instruction on the lesser 
included offense of assault by striking, beating or wounding.23 
The jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser offense where-
upon he appealed, contending the court lacked jurisdiction to 
sentence him on any crime not enumerated in section 1153. u 
The Bowman court affirmed the lower court's determination 
that jurisdiction was present. The Ninth Circuit relied on the 
Supreme Court's holding in Keeble v. United States2G that an 
Indian defendant is entitled to an instruction for a lesser in-
cluded offense.26 The Keeble Court, however, did not reach the 
question of whether the trial court had the power to sentence 
the defendant on the lesser included offense. 
In Bowman, the Ninth Circuit argued that the Keeble Court 
had implicitly decided the issue of jurisdiction and the lower 
court's power to sentence a defendant on the lesser offense. The 
trial court in Keeble did not give the requested instruction be-
cause it believed it had no jurisdiction to do so. Therefore, in 
reversing the trial court, the Keeble Court was implicitly holding 
that the jurisdiction to give the instruction was present and that 
the lower court had the power to sentence a defendant on such a 
charge.27 
The Bowman court found that the Supreme Court's empha-
sis on the desire for "parity of treatment"28 of all criminal defen-
dants in federal courts was compelling even in light of the fear 
that the holding would extend the reach of the Major Crimes 
Act.29 The Ninth Circuit referred to the possible abuses related 
(1974). 
22. The Major Crimes Act specifically enumerates several of the more serious crimes 
that come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The Indians retain ju-
risdiction over the lesser offenses included within the enumerated crimes. 
23. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c) provides: "The defendant may be found guilty of an of-
fense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the 
offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense." 
24. 679 F.2d at 799. 
25. 412 U.S. 205 (1973). 
26. [d. at 214. 
27. 679 F.2d at 799. 
28. [d. at 800. 
29. [d. 
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to the inclusion of lesser offense instructions under section 1153: 
the overcharging of a defendant to gain a conviction on a lesser 
offense. However, the facts of Bowman did not present this is-
sue. The Bowman court also cited dicta from Keeble to support 
its limited consideration of the mutuality question.30 The major-
ity in Bowman concluded by reluctantly adhering to the Keeble 
rule while noting the difficulty of reconciling the rule with the 
history of section 1153 and "the congressional intent to confer 
only limited jurisdiction."31 
The dissent in Bowman stressed that the majority's reliance 
on Keeble was a departure from the established jurisdictional 
structure of Indian criminallaw.32 The dissent argued that Kee-
ble was only a determination of "procedural rights to which In-
dian defendants are entitled in federal court."33 More impor-
tantly, the result of the holding in Bowman would be to deprive 
"the tribal courts of exclusive jurisdiction by implication . . . 
. "34 The essence of the dissent's objection was that exclusive tri-
bal jurisdiction can be extinguished only by an act of Congress 
and not by implication.311 
Bowman represents another inroad into the area of tribal 
jurisdiction. Most importantly, the route taken by the Ninth 
Circuit, the implicit recognition of expanded jurisdiction, is a 
shortcut clearly threatening the diminishing powers of tribal 
courts. 
30. [d., citing Keeble, 412 U.S. at 214 n.14. See also United States v. Whitaker, 447 
F.2d 314, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
31. 679 F.2d at 800. 
32. [d. at 801. 
33. [d. 
34. [d. at 802. 
35. [d. at 803. 
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